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SUING  AMERICANS  FOR  HUMAN  RIGHTS  TORTS
OVERSEAS:  THE  SUPREME  COURT  LEAVES
THE  DOOR  OPEN
Doug Cassel *
INTRODUCTION
If American citizens or corporations commit gross violations of human
rights against foreign victims on foreign shores, can the victims sue the Amer-
icans for damages in United States federal courts?
Until recently the answer was clearly yes.  However, following the diverse
opinions in the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co.,1 the question has divided lower courts to date.2  This Article argues that,
as a matter of both domestic and international law, and under both the
majority and minority rationales in Kiobel, federal courts can and should hear
tort suits against American nationals for human rights violations they commit
against foreign victims in foreign countries.
The statutory basis of both jurisdiction and the cause of action is the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).  Originally passed in 1789, the ATS grants district
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1 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
2 Some courts have dismissed suits against American corporations on the ground that
Kiobel bars suits for human rights violations committed in foreign countries, even by Ameri-
can companies. See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 194 (2d Cir. 2013); Giraldo v.
Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103981, at *32–33 (N.D.
Ala. July 25, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 (GBL/JFA), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92937, at *50 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013).  Others take the view that suits against
American nationals sufficiently “touch and concern” the United States to be actionable,
even where the principal or exclusive violations were committed in foreign countries. See
Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117963, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
20, 2013) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge), adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 142538 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-
30051-MAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114754, at *36–44 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013).  For discus-
sion, see infra Section II.D.
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courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”3
The ATS essentially lay dormant for two centuries until resurrected in
1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 when the Second Circuit ruled that a
Paraguayan dissident could bring an ATS suit in U.S. courts against a
Paraguayan police chief for official torture committed in Paraguay.  Both
plaintiff and defendant resided in the United States at the time the suit was
filed.5  Lower courts thereafter entertained numerous ATS suits for overseas
human rights violations.6
Not until 2004 did the Supreme Court first pronounce on the ATS.  In
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,7 the Court read the ATS as double-barreled—not
only conferring jurisdiction, but also authorizing judicial recognition of com-
mon law causes of action for torts in violation of international law.  The ATS
is thus not a mere jurisdictional grant, useless absent further legislation creat-
ing a cause of action.  Rather it also authorizes federal courts to recognize
causes of action for violations of international law norms, so long as the
norms are widely accepted and specifically defined.8  The Sosa Court cited
Filartiga in support of both the ATS authorization to recognize causes of
action,9 and the limits thereon.10
Sosa involved an alleged tort committed in Mexico by Mexicans against a
Mexican citizen (albeit at the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency).11  Still, the Court did not then address whether ATS jurisdiction to
recognize common law tort claims extends to torts committed outside the
United States.  Not until 2013 in Kiobel, a suit brought by Nigerian plaintiffs
against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations for alleged torts in Nige-
ria,12 did the Court pass on the extraterritorial reach of the ATS.  Invoking a
presumption against applying statutes extraterritorially, the five-member
Kiobel majority ruled that the ATS does not generally allow federal courts to
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
4 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
5 Id. at 878–79.
6 E.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated and reh’g en banc
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).  The case was reportedly settled. Final Settlement
Reached in Doe v. Unocal, EARTHRIGHTS INT’L (March 21, 2005), http://www.earthrights
.org/legal/final-settlement-reached-doe-v-unocal.  EarthRights International was co-coun-
sel for plaintiffs in the case.  Although the terms of the settlement were confidential, it
reportedly reached $30 million.  Paul Magnusson, A Milestone for Human Rights, BUSINESS-
WEEK, Jan. 24, 2005, at 63.  For an overall history and analysis of ATS cases, see Beth Ste-
phens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467 (2014).
7 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
8 Id. at 724–25, 731–32.
9 Id. at  731 (“The position we take today has been assumed by some federal courts
for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga . . . .”).
10 Id. at 732 (“This limit upon judicial recognition is generally consistent with the
reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this
Court.”  (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980))).
11 Id. at 698.
12 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 (2013).
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recognize causes of actions for torts committed in foreign countries.13  How-
ever, the majority relied extensively on Sosa14 (adjudicating an alleged tort in
a foreign state) and was silent on Filartiga (also adjudicating a tort in a for-
eign state), without suggesting that either landmark case was wrongly
decided.
Moreover, the Kiobel majority did not specifically address whether the
ATS allows causes of action for torts committed overseas by American citizens
or corporations.  In contrast, four Justices, while concurring in the result in
Kiobel (a suit against foreign corporations), expressly opined that the ATS con-
fers jurisdiction, within limits, to recognize causes of action for torts commit-
ted abroad by American nationals,15 possibly including corporations.16
In this author’s view, the concurring Justices are correct in allowing ATS
suits against Americans for foreign torts.17  And contrary to narrow readings
by some lower courts,18 even the majority’s rationale allows space for ATS
causes of action for torts committed by Americans overseas. Kiobel was a suit
by foreign plaintiffs, against foreign defendants, for foreign conduct.19  In
that “foreign-cubed” case,20 the limited American jurisdictional interests at
stake—mainly to afford redress for heinous international torts21—were not
enough to persuade the majority to overcome its presumption against extra-
territorial application.  Nor were they enough to convince the four Justices
concurring in the result that there were sufficient “distinct American inter-
ests” to justify ATS jurisdiction in that case.22
But the calculus is different when the alleged overseas tortfeasors are
Americans.  When Americans violate human rights in other countries, the
13 Id. at 1669.
14 Id. at 1662–69.
15 Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
16 See infra note 85.
17 Indeed, as explained by the amicus brief of the European Union, there are strong
arguments for allowing ATS suits for overseas torts in even broader circumstances than
those recognized by Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion.  Brief of the European Commis-
sion on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at
13–26, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) [herein-
after EU Amicus Brief].
18 See supra note 2; infra Section II.D.
19 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
20 The phrase “foreign-cubed” refers to the three foreign aspects of a case: foreign
plaintiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign location of the tort. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl.
Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (“This is the first so-called ‘foreign-cubed’
securities class action to reach this Circuit.” (citing Stuart M. Grant & Diane Zilka, The Role
of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions, in CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE HAND-
BOOK SERIES (Number B-1442) 91, 96 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 2004) (coining the
term “foreign-cubed”))), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
21 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676–77 (Breyer, J., concurring); EU Amicus Brief, supra
note 17, at 17–26; infra subsection IV.C.1.
22 Justice Breyer would allow ATS suits for foreign conduct only where there are suffi-
cient “distinct American interests” in the case. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
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jurisdiction of U.S. courts is supported, not only by the U.S. foreign policy
commitment to human rights,23 but also by other factors.  They include the
internationally recognized right of victims of gross violations of human rights
to effective remedies,24 the international law principle of a state’s jurisdiction
over its own nationals acting abroad,25 and the nation’s internationally recog-
nized interest26—and indeed international best practice27—to police its own
wrongdoers.  Collectively, these interests generally combine in cases against
Americans to outweigh any presumption against applying statutes extraterri-
torially.  In the terms used by the concurring Justices, suits against Americans
possess the requisite “distinct American interests” to support ATS
jurisdiction.28
But not in every case.  In some cases a foreign state may have a stronger
claim to jurisdiction.  In other cases, judicial efficiency or foreign policy con-
cerns may counsel in favor of foreign rather than U.S. jurisdiction.  The four
concurring Justices were thus correct to signal that ATS jurisdiction may be
subject on a case-by-case basis to doctrines of exhaustion of foreign remedies,
forum non conveniens, comity toward other sovereign nations, and due defer-
ence to the foreign policy views of the executive branch.29
But there are limits to the limits: they must not in effect defeat the very
jurisdiction whose importance the four concurring Justices rightly recognize.
For example, exhaustion of foreign remedies should not necessarily be
required when American defendants are sued exclusively or as principals,
and should in any event be subject to the exceptions established by interna-
tional law.30
Part I of this Article shows that both international and domestic law rec-
ognize the right of states to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over cases
against their nationals for serious misconduct abroad.  Parts II through V
then consider whether the ATS should be interpreted to exercise this juris-
23 See generally Brief of Former United States Diplomats Diego Asencio et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491) [hereinafter Diplomats Amicus Brief].  This author was counsel for
the twenty-three former American diplomats who argued on the basis of their experience
that ATS suits for violations of human rights committed in other countries are sometimes
in the interest of U.S. foreign policy, and sometimes not.  Therefore the determination
must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the views of the executive
branch, and potentially making use of such judicial management techniques as narrowing
of claims and discovery in order to minimize any adverse foreign policy impacts.
24 See infra subsection IV.C.3.
25 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675–76; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) (1987). See generally EU Amicus Brief, supra note 17,
at 11–13.
26 See infra subsection IV.C.2.
27 See infra subsection IV.C.2.
28 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
29 Id.
30 As explained in infra Section V.A, foreign remedies must be exhausted in appropri-
ate cases only if they are adequate, effective, accessible, not unduly delayed, and consistent
with due process of law.
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dictional authority.  Part II summarizes the contrasting opinions in Kiobel and
their implications for ATS claims against Americans for torts committed
abroad.  Part III shows that, regardless of whether one takes an “international
law” or “domestic law” approach to interpreting the reach of the statute, the
ATS authorizes claims against Americans for torts committed on foreign
shores.  Part IV outlines the differing foreign policy interests underlying the
Justices’ divergent views on the territorial reach of the ATS.  It concludes that
the interests in favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction over ATS suits against
Americans generally prevail.  Part V addresses case-by-case limits on such
suits.
This Article does not revisit the issue on which review was originally
granted in Kiobel—whether corporations may ever be sued under the ATS.31
All nine Justices decided the case instead on the issue of extraterritoriality;
none expressly opined on whether corporations may be sued.  This author
has argued elsewhere that corporations are proper defendants in ATS suits.32
The majority of federal courts of appeals addressing the issue agree that cor-
porations may be sued.33  Rather than reargue the point here, this Article
simply assumes that corporations may be sued.  But even if the Supreme
Court were some day to rule that corporations may not be sued, the argu-
ments in favor of ATS jurisdiction over suits against American nationals for
overseas human rights torts would still apply to suits against individual Ameri-
cans, such as corporate executives.34
31 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
32 Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the
Courts, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304 (2008).  For a brief, but thoughtful summary, see
William S. Dodge, Corporate Liability Under Customary International Law, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L.
1045 (2012).
33 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (dic-
tum), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.); Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–21 (7th Cir. 2011); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d
11, 39–57 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir.
2013) (mem.) (per curiam). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,
145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659.  Recently a Ninth Circuit panel
read Kiobel as “suggesting in dicta that corporations may be liable under ATS.”  Doe v.
Nestle USA, Inc., No. 10-56739, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 25204, at *4 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2013)
(citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669).
34 I do not suggest that suits against corporate executives are an adequate substitute
for suits against corporations.  For example, it may be more difficult for plaintiffs to find
evidence showing the culpable knowledge or actions of a particular executive than of the
corporation as an entity. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 473–75 (2001).
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I. BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW RECOGNIZE THAT STATES MAY
EXERCISE  JURISDICTION OVER THE SERIOUS MISCONDUCT
OF THEIR NATIONALS ABROAD
Both international and domestic law recognize the right of states, includ-
ing the United States, to exercise jurisdiction, and to recognize causes of
action, in cases against their nationals for serious misconduct abroad.
So long as the exercise is reasonable,35 there is no dispute that states
may choose to exercise such jurisdiction and to recognize such causes of
action.36  The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States recognizes that a nation may “prescribe law with respect to . . . the
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside . . . its terri-
tory.”37  A leading international law text agrees that “States have an undis-
puted right” to apply their laws to their own citizens, “wherever they may
be.”38
In Kiobel, the British and Dutch governments—which as amici curiae
opposed the exercise of extraterritorial ATS jurisdiction over British and
Dutch companies39—nonetheless agreed that “active personality jurisdic-
tion,” by which the United States could apply the ATS extraterritorially to
Americans, “is very clearly asserted (and accepted) in State practice, and is
35 See infra note 220; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES §§ 402(2), 403 (1987).  Because the ATS both grants jurisdiction and
authorizes courts to recognize causes of action (with both substantive and remedial compo-
nents), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), one may debate whether the applicable international law
rules are those governing a state’s jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, or to enforce by
judicial means (or some combination thereof). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) (jurisdiction to prescribe),
and id. § 421 (jurisdiction to adjudicate), with id. § 431(1) (jurisdiction to enforce judi-
cially).  For purposes of ATS claims against U.S. nationals for torts committed abroad, how-
ever, the debate is academic.  All three categories authorize states to exercise jurisdiction
over acts abroad by their own nationals, id. §§ 402(2), 421(2)(d)–(e), 431(1), subject to
the limit that the exercise be reasonable. Id. §§ 403, 421(1)–(2), 431(1)–(2).  The reason-
ableness tests for jurisdiction to prescribe and to adjudicate (prerequisites for enforce-
ment) are sufficiently broad and vague that nothing about ATS suits against U.S. nationals
turns on which test is used. See id. §§ 403, 421(1)–(2), 431.  This Article follows Justice
Breyer, who used the Restatement provisions on jurisdiction to prescribe, namely sec-
tions 402, 403, and 404. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673–74 (Breyer, J., concurring); see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402–04 (1987).
36 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(2) (1987).
38 Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335, 345 (Malcolm D. Evans ed.,
2d ed. 2006).
39 See Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 5–6, 18–23, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491) [hereinafter UK Dutch Amicus Brief].
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well established in international law.”40  Calling the same principle by a dif-
ferent name, the European Commission termed the “nationality principle”
an “uncontroversial basis for jurisdiction under international law.”41
The Supreme Court of the United States long ago reached a consistent
conclusion.  In Blackmer v. United States,42 involving a witness subpoena issued
by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to an American citizen in
France,43 the Court in 1932 recognized that there was “no question of inter-
national law.”44  Quoting leading international law authorities,45 the Court
explained, “The law of Nations does not prevent a State from exercising juris-
diction over its subjects travelling or residing abroad, since they remain
under its personal supremacy.”46  “[S]o far as citizens of the United States in
foreign countries are concerned,” the question about applying the relevant
U.S. statute extraterritorially “is one of construction, not of legislative
power.”47
The only question of ATS jurisdiction and causes of action for serious
torts committed by Americans abroad, then, is the proper construction of the
ATS.  International law recognizes the right of states to exercise such jurisdic-
tion and to recognize such causes of action.
40 Id. at 14.  For example, Canadian courts have presumptive jurisdiction over foreign
torts where the defendant is “domiciled or resident” in Canada.  Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van
Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, paras. 81–82, 85–86, 90(a) (Can.).
41 EU Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 11.  EU law, governing the twenty-eight EU mem-
ber states, Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2014), and other European states who join the regulations voluntarily,
makes jurisdiction turn mainly on domicile.  The EU default rule is that “persons domi-
ciled” in an EU state “shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of” the domi-
ciliary state.  Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 2.1,
3.1, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 3–4 (EC) [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]; Council Decision
2007/712/EC of 15 October 2007 on the Signing, on Behalf of the Community, of the
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, arts. 2, 3.1, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3 [hereinafter Lugano II Conven-
tion].  In tort cases they may also be sued in the state where the “harmful event” takes
place.  Brussels I Regulation, supra, art. 5.3; Lugano II Convention, supra, art. 5.3.
42 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
43 Id. at 433, 436.
44 Id. at 437.
45 Id. at 437 n.2.
46 Id. (citing EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
§ 13, at 21–22 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1915); 1 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 240, at 424 (1922); 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 202,
at 255–56 (1906); OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 145, at 281 (Arnold D. McNair ed.,
4th ed. 1926); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 540, at 755 (Mel-
ville M. Bigelow ed., 8th ed. 1883)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Blackmer, 284 U.S. at 437 (citing Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622
(1925); United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 102 (1922); Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)).
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II. THE FOUR OPINIONS IN KIOBEL
In recent decades, lower federal courts have exercised ATS jurisdiction
over tort suits brought by foreign plaintiffs, against foreign defendants, for
foreign conduct allegedly violating human rights.48  In Kiobel, however, the
Supreme Court held unanimously (but on differing rationales) that the ATS
did not reach that “foreign-cubed” suit.49
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, joined by five members of the Court,50 inter-
preted the ATS in light of the presumption that a statute does not apply
extraterritorially unless Congress clearly indicates that it does.51  Because in
the majority’s view Congress gave no such indication in the ATS,52 the major-
ity found that the ATS did not authorize the causes of action in the Kiobel
suit,53 which was brought by Nigerian plaintiffs, against British, Dutch, and
Nigerian corporations, for alleged human rights torts in Nigeria.54
However, the majority did not necessarily rule out suits against American
defendants for human rights torts overseas.  It ventured that “even where the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application” of the ATS.55  It was silent on whether claims against American
citizens—subject to American jurisdiction under international law—would
sufficiently “touch and concern”56 the United States to warrant jurisdiction
under the ATS.  The majority opinion thus left unanswered the question of
whether the ATS affords jurisdiction over suits against American citizens or
corporations for human rights violations committed overseas.  The opinion
was equally silent on whether corporations can be sued at all under the
ATS57 (the question on which certiorari had originally been granted).58
B. Justices Concurring in the Result and the Reasoning
Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion59 but concurred sepa-
rately.60  He, too, was silent on whether ATS suits can be brought against
48 E.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742, 744, 747–48 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (dictum), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (mem.).
49 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); see supra note 20
and accompanying text.
50 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
51 Id. at 1664, 1669.
52 Id. at 1665–69.
53 Id. at 1663, 1669.
54 Id. at 1662–63.
55 Id. at 1669.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1663, 1669.
58 Id. at 1663.
59 Id. at 1662.
60 Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Americans for human rights torts committed in other countries.61  However,
he did allow that there may be cases of foreign torts not covered “by the
reasoning and holding of today’s case; and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may
require some further elaboration and explanation.”62
Because ATS jurisdiction over American nationals for torts committed
abroad was explicitly asserted by Justice Breyer,63 Justice Kennedy was cer-
tainly aware of the issue.  The fact that he did not explicitly address it, and
referred only to future “elaboration and explanation” of the presumption
against extraterritoriality,64 suggests that he left the door open to resolve the
issue in a future case.
The same cannot be said of two other Justices who also joined in the
majority opinion.65  In their separate concurring opinion, Justices Alito and
Thomas would have barred ATS suits over human rights violations “unless
the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm.”66
C. Justices Concurring in the Result but Not the Reasoning
In the final opinion in Kiobel, four other Justices concurred in the result
but not the reasoning.67  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, agreed with the majority that the ATS did not author-
ize the claims in Kiobel, because it was a suit by foreign plaintiffs, against
foreign defendants, for foreign torts, without a sufficient “distinct American
interest[ ]” in the case.68
However, these four Justices rejected the applicability to the ATS of the
presumption against applying statutes extraterritorially.69  Noting the obser-
vation in a prior case that the presumption “rests on the perception that
Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign mat-
ters,”70 Justice Breyer pointed out that, in enacting the ATS, Congress clearly
had “‘foreign matters’ in mind”71: the ATS expressly refers to suits by
“alien[s],” based on violations of “treat[ies]” and “the law of nations,”72 and
indisputably allows claims against pirates for torts committed on ships under
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See infra Section II.C.
64 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra notes 59–62 and
accompanying text.
65 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662 (majority opinion).
66 Id. at 1670 (Alito & Thomas, JJ., concurring).
67 Id. (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & Kagan, JJ., concurring).
68 Id. at 1674–78.
69 Id. at 1671.
70 Id. at 1672 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 Id. (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877).
72 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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foreign jurisdiction.73  In his view, these add up to sufficient signals that Con-
gress contemplated potential extraterritorial application of the ATS.74
In lieu of relying on the majority’s presumption and “guided in part by
principles and practices of foreign relations law,”75 Justice Breyer would look
to “international jurisdictional norms” to interpret the ATS.76  He would thus
interpret the ATS to allow jurisdiction to recognize causes of action for for-
eign violations of international law, but “only where distinct American inter-
ests are at issue.”77  Specifically, he would allow ATS causes of action for
overseas torts in at least two circumstances authorized by international law.
One is where “important American national interest[s]” are “substantially
and adversely affect[ed]” by foreign torts, including the “interest in not
becoming a safe harbor” for foreign nationals who come here after commit-
ting human rights violations overseas.78  That circumstance is beyond the
scope of this Article.
The other circumstance is the focus of this Article: where “the defendant
is an American national.”79  International law and practice authorize states to
exercise jurisdiction and recognize claims, within limits, over torts committed
by their nationals outside their territories.80  Justice Breyer noted the Euro-
pean Commission’s amicus brief, which stated that “[i]t is ‘uncontroversial’
that the ‘United States may . . . exercise jurisdiction over ATS claims involv-
ing conduct committed by its own nationals within the territory of another
sovereign, consistent with international law.’”81  He cited cases from Britain
and the Netherlands82 (the home countries of two of the corporate defend-
ants in Kiobel)83 to show that “[m]any countries permit foreign plaintiffs to
bring suits against their own nationals based on unlawful conduct that took
place abroad.”84
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1672–73.
75 Id. at 1671.
76 Id. at 1673.
77 Id. at 1673–74.
78 Id. at 1674.
79 Id.
80 See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
81 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1676 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting EU Amicus Brief, supra
note 17, at 11).
82 Id. at 1675–76.
83 Id. at 1662 (majority opinion).
84 Id. at 1675–76 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing UK Dutch Amicus Brief, supra note
39, at 19–23 (citing inter alia Rb. Gravenhage [Court of the Hague] 30 December 2009,
JOR 2010, 41 m.nt. Mr. RGJ de Haan (Oguro/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (involving
conduct of Dutch respondent in Nigeria); Guerrero v. Monterrico Metals PLC, [2009]
EWHC 2475 (QB) (involving conduct of U.K. companies in Peru); Lubbe v. Cape PLC,
[2000] UKHL 41 (H.L.) (involving conduct of U.K. companies in South Africa))).
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Justice Breyer also arguably implied, but stopped short of making clear,
that ATS claims for foreign torts could be brought, not only against individ-
ual Americans, but also against American corporations.85
Responding to the majority’s concerns that allowing ATS suits for over-
seas torts could lead to conflicts with foreign nations,86 and could open the
door to Americans being sued in other countries for human rights violations
in the United States,87 Justice Breyer imposed at least four “limiting princi-
ples” on such ATS suits: they would be subject in appropriate cases to the
doctrines of “exhaustion” of foreign remedies, “forum non conveniens,” “com-
ity” toward foreign nations, and due judicial deference “to the views of the
Executive Branch.”88
D. Implications for ATS Suits Against Americans for Torts Overseas
The four separate opinions in Kiobel thus fall along a spectrum with
respect to the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction allowed under the ATS.
At one extreme, Justices Alito and Thomas would allow ATS claims only
where domestic conduct in the United States violates international law with suffi-
cient clarity and international acceptance to be cognizable under the ATS.89
While this does not necessarily mean that conduct outside the United States
could never be the subject of an ATS claim, conduct abroad could never be
the sole basis for an ATS claim.  At minimum, the foreign conduct would
apparently have to be coupled with conduct inside the United States that is
sufficient, by itself, to constitute an ATS claim.90
In contrast, the majority opinion leaves the door ajar to allow a foreign
tort by an American to constitute, by itself, a sufficient basis for an ATS cause
of action.  The majority opinion would generally ban extraterritorial ATS
claims, except where the foreign violations “touch and concern” the United
States “with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterrito-
rial application.”91  But beyond clarifying that the “mere corporate presence”
85 See id. at 1677–78.  Justice Breyer opined that a “minimal and indirect American
presence” by a foreign corporation, through trading of its shares on the New York Stock
Exchange and having an office in New York run by an affiliate, did not suffice to justify ATS
jurisdiction.  See id.  By implication, if the foreign company instead had a major and direct
American presence, ATS jurisdiction would arguably exist.  But one cannot be certain,
since neither Justice Breyer nor any other member of the Court answered the question on
which certiorari was originally granted—whether corporations can be sued at all under the
ATS. See id. at 1663 (majority opinion); supra notes 50–84 and accompanying text.
86 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664–65.
87 Id. at 1669.
88 Id. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
89 Id. at 1669–70 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing the standards for ATS conduct set forth
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24, 732 (2004)).
90 See, e.g., Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114754, at *36–44 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013) (noting that tortious conduct by U.S.
citizen “in large part” committed in the United States was sufficient for ATS claim).
91 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2883–88 (2010)).
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in the United States of a foreign corporation92 (such as Royal Dutch in
Kiobel)93 does not meet that threshold,94 the majority did not say what form
or degree of connection to the United States is needed to sufficiently “touch
and concern”95 the United States.  In particular, it did not say whether the
fact that the alleged tortfeasor is an American citizen or corporation would
satisfy its test.96
A possible reading of the “touch and concern” language is that it would
allow ATS jurisdiction in both Sosa and Filartiga.  Neither of these ATS
landmark cases was disavowed by the majority, which in fact relied extensively
on Sosa.97  Although both cases were “foreign-cubed”—with foreign plain-
tiffs, foreign defendants, and foreign tortious conduct98—they had aspects
which arguably “touched and concerned” the United States.  In Sosa, the tort
was apparently planned and directed by U.S. government agents.99  In Filar-
tiga, both plaintiff and defendant resided in the United States at the time the
ATS suit was filed.100
Had the majority expressly applied its presumption against extraterrito-
riality to these precedents, however, Filartiga, at least, should not have won
the votes of Justices Alito and Thomas, whose concurring opinion required
that domestic conduct in the United States suffice to violate an international
law norm.101  On the other hand, if the majority opinion had disavowed
Filartiga, let alone Sosa, one wonders whether Justice Kennedy would still
have joined the opinion.102  It may well be that the undefined content of the
“touch and concern” phrase was a deliberate ambiguity, designed precisely to
attract five votes.
In attempting to parse the Kiobel majority opinion, some lower courts all
but disregard the “touch and concern” exception, reading Kiobel simply to
bar ATS suits based on conduct outside the United States.103  Others
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1662.
94 Id. at 1669.
95 Id.
96 See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text.
97 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–69.
98 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
99 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004).
100 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980).
101 See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
102 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 194 (2d Cir. 2013); Chen v. Honghui Shi,
No. 09 Civ. 8920 (RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110409, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013);
Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103981, at
*32–33 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2013); Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-827 (GBL/JFA),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92937, at *2, *50 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2013).  Some courts, confronted
with extremely weak or frivolous, often pro se, claims, adopted similar views without serious
analysis. E.g., Ben-Haim v. Neeman, No. 13-1522, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 22339, at *6–7
(3d Cir. Nov. 4, 2013) (holding subject matter jurisdiction “lacking” because the “conduct”
occurred in Israel and Kiobel held “that the ATS does not apply when all of the relevant
conduct took place outside the United States” (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669)); Muntslag
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acknowledge that the “touch and concern” language, especially read
together with Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, appears to leave the
door open to ATS jurisdiction over some extraterritorial torts.104  Indeed,
two courts to date have read Kiobel to allow ATS suits against U.S. citizens or
v. Beerens, No. 12-cv-07168 (TPG), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121035, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
26, 2013) (stating that plaintiff fails under Kiobel where the “conduct . . . occurred” outside
the United States (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669)); Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v. Obama, No. 1:13-
cv-49-MW-GRJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101281, at *3–4 (N.D. Fla. July 1, 2013) (holding that
plaintiff fails under Kiobel because the conduct “occurred outside the United States” and
did not sufficiently “‘touch’” or “‘concern’” the United States (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at
1662, 1669)); Mwangi v. Bush, No. 5: 12-373-KKC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85842, at *9 (E.D.
Ky. June 18, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff fails under Kiobel because the “con-
duct . . . occurred” outside the United States (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669)); Ahmed-Al-
Khalifa v. Elizabeth, No. 5:13cv103/RS/CJK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71682, at *4–6 (N.D.
Fla. Apr. 19, 2013) (stating that plaintiff fails under Kiobel because the conduct “occurred
outside of the United States” and did not sufficiently “‘touch’ or ‘concern’ the United
States” (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659)); Murillo v. Bain, No. H-11-2373, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56981, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2013) (citing Kiobel for the statement that “Ameri-
can laws like the Alien Tort Statute and Torture Victim Protection Act are presumed not
apply [sic] beyond the borders of the United States” (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659)).
104 E.g., Aldana v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.A. Inc., No. 12-16143, 2014 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2231, at *4 n.1 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2014) (dismissing case on other grounds, and
observing in dicta only that Kiobel “may well bar” a suit against a U.S. company for alleged
human rights violations in Guatemala); Du Daobin v. CISCO Sys., Inc., No. PJM 11-1538,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22632, at *24–26 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2014) (dismissing case on other
grounds and observing, without deciding, that the presumption against extraterritoriality
did not bar an ATS suit against an “American company” for alleged human rights viola-
tions committed “predominantly, if not entirely” in the United States).  In Du Daobin, the
court observed, “It is not yet clear when and under what circumstances ATS claims will
‘touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.’” Id. at *24–25 (quoting Kiobel, 133 S.
Ct. at 1669); NTSebeza v. Daimler AG, No. 03 Civ. 4524 (SAS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181647, at *5–7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2013) (dismissing ATS claims against “foreign defend-
ants” because their activities could not plausibly “touch and concern” the United States,
while ordering further briefs on the question, inter alia, of whether the activities of U.S.
defendants sufficiently touched and concerned the United States); Chen Gang v. Zhao
Zhizhen, No. 3:04CV1146 (RNC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134510, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 20,
2013) (“Because the alleged abuses occurred in China and do not sufficiently ‘touch and
concern’ the United States, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction . . . .”);
Tymoshenko v. Firtash, No. 11-CV-2794 (KMW), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123240, at *11–12
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013) (“Although the Supreme Court did note that there may be situa-
tions in which a tort committed outside the [United States] is nonetheless actionable—
namely, ‘where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States . . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption . . .’—the Court failed to provide guidance
regarding what is necessary to satisfy the ‘touch and concern’ standard.” (quoting Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. at 1669)); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10-483
(RCL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117528, at *52 (D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013) (“[T]he Court
appeared to leave room for future cases in which the conduct took place outside the
United States . . . .”); Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 69, 71
(D.D.C. 2013) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court in Kiobel . . . ‘le[ft] open a number of
significant questions’  and that ‘the Supreme Court appears to have set a very high bar for
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residents for torts committed overseas (albeit in one case the tortious acts
were committed “in large part” in the United States).105  Another court read
Kiobel to allow a suit for torts committed during an attack on the U.S.
Embassy in Kenya, an attack plotted in part within the United States.106
The only extended appellate analysis of Kiobel to date is a Second
Circuit panel opinion written by the same judge who authored the origi-
nal appellate opinion in Kiobel (ruling that corporations cannot be
sued under the ATS).107  In Balintulo, a suit brought by South Africans
against one foreign company (Daimler AG) and two U.S. companies (Ford
and IBM) for alleged complicity in apartheid, the Second Circuit panel
dismissed the “touch and concern” language in Kiobel as mere dicta.108
It opined that Kiobel “plainly bars common-law suits” under the ATS
which are based solely on conduct occurring abroad.109  In its view, this
plaintiffs’” (quoting Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (alteration in
original))).
105 Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117963, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Aug. 20, 2013) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (“I also find that as [the
defendant is] a permanent resident of the United States, the presumption against extrater-
ritoriality has been overcome in this case.”), adopted by 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142538 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 2, 2013); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, No. 12-cv-30051-MAP, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114754, at *36–44 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013) (stating that an ATS suit “against
an American citizen who has allegedly violated the law of nations in large part through
actions committed within this country fits comfortably within the limits described in
Kiobel”).
106 Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–6 (D.D.C. 2013) (allowing suit but order-
ing plaintiffs to apply for interlocutory appeal, and staying proceedings pending a ruling
by the court of appeals).
107 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc
denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
108 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) (denying petition for writ
of mandamus).  The panel seemed to interpret the “touch and concern” language as
addressing only the situation where some conduct occurs abroad and some in the United
States. Id. The author of the Balintulo opinion later authored another opinion which
similarly dismissed an ATS suit on the ground that the alleged conduct took place abroad.
Chowdhury v. WorldTel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., No. 09-4483-cv, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2507,
at *16–17 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 2014).  A concurring judge clarified her agreement that the
case did not “touch and concern” the United States because the alleged conduct “took
place entirely in Bangladesh.” Id. at *44 (Pooler, J., concurring).  Nothing in the opinions
suggests that any defendants were U.S. citizens or U.S. corporations. See id. at *4.
109 Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 181–82, 192–93.  Repeatedly referring only to “common-law”
suits under the ATS, id. at 181–82, 185, 188, 191–92, 194, the panel noted that “Justice
Breyer seems to have understood the Court’s opinion as leaving open whether the ATS can
provide jurisdiction over ‘a statutory claim’ . . . where Congress evinces sufficient intent to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.”  Id. at 192 n.27 (quoting Kiobel, 133
S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring)).  Some language in the Kiobel majority opinion
would indeed support such an interpretation.  For example, the majority states, “Nothing
about this historical context suggests that Congress also intended federal common law
under the ATS to provide a cause of action for conduct occurring in the territory of
another sovereign.” Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668–69.
2014] suing  americans  for  human  rights  torts  overseas 1787
Kiobel holding was “unambiguous” and “obvious,” evincing “bright-line
clarity.”110
This writer respectfully disagrees.  The Kiobel majority’s “touch and con-
cern” language111 was dicta precisely because the majority was not necessarily
addressing all the questions that might arise with respect to the territorial
reach of the ATS.  As noted by Justice Kennedy, whose concurring opinion—
and crucial fifth vote112—was all but ignored by the Balintulo panel113: “The
opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of significant ques-
tions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.”114  If
the majority had aimed for “bright-line clarity,”115 for example, it might have
expressly rejected Justice Breyer’s suggestions that the ATS allows suits based
on conduct committed abroad by American nationals and by foreign human
rights violators who seek safe haven in the United States.116  In the face of
these vigorously argued suggestions, the majority’s silence seems hardly
“unambiguous.”117
A more ambiguous reading of the majority opinion is consistent with the
concurring opinion of its fifth vote.  Justice Kennedy opted for an open-
ended, unspecified reservation of future “elaboration and explanation” of
the “proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial
application.”118  If and when a case involving a tort allegedly committed by
an American overseas comes before the Court, Justice Kennedy’s past opin-
ions on extraterritoriality suggest that, even then, he may well refrain from a
categorical answer.119  He would be likely to undertake a pragmatic, fact-spe-
cific, case-by-case analysis of whether a particular suit against an American is
sufficiently connected to the United States to justify extraterritorial applica-
tion of the ATS.
If Justice Kennedy allowed such a suit, his opinion would likely define a
new majority.  As noted above, Justice Breyer, writing for himself and three
other Justices, expressly deemed the fact that an “American national” is the
110 Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 182, 189.  The panel went so far as to count the majority
opinion’s framing of the question (three times), id. at 189 (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662,
1664–65), and its references to the “location of the . . . ‘conduct’” in Kiobel (at least eight
times). Id. (citing Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1665–69).
111 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
112 See id. at 1662.
113 The panel’s only reference to Justice Kennedy’s concurrence was a footnote stating,
“see also id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).” Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 n.26.
114 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
115 See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189.
116 See supra notes 55–58, 75–85 and accompanying text.
117 See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 182.
118 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730, 755–66 (2008) (Kennedy, J.);
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636–655 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485–88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275–78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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alleged tortfeasor to be sufficient to justify ATS jurisdiction120—subject in
appropriate cases to the limits of exhaustion, forum non conveniens, comity,
and deference.121
In this writer’s view, Justice Breyer not only reached the right result on
this point, but also correctly articulated why the ATS grants jurisdiction over
suits against American nationals for serious human rights violations commit-
ted overseas, subject to limits on a case-by-case basis.122  However, even under
the majority’s rationale, one may conclude with good reason that suits
against American nationals sufficiently “touch and concern” the United
States to “displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”123
III. BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW SUPPORT ATS JURISDICTION
AND CLAIMS AGAINST AMERICANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
TORTS COMMITTED ABROAD
Justice Breyer “would assume that Congress intended the statute’s juris-
dictional reach to match the statute’s underlying substantive grasp.”124  In
other words, “just as we have looked to established international substantive
norms to help determine the statute’s substantive reach, so we should look to
international jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s jurisdic-
tional scope.”125
If that “international law” approach to interpreting the ATS is taken,
then ATS jurisdiction over human rights torts committed by American
nationals overseas is a slam dunk.  As discussed in Part I above, it is “undis-
puted” and “uncontroversial” that international law permits states to exercise
jurisdiction over the activities of their nationals abroad, subject to the limits
of reasonableness.126
Conforming both the substantive content and the jurisdictional reach of
the ATS to the law of nations seems likely to be what the Congress of a
fledgling United States, anxious to earn a place of respect in the world, might
have intended in 1789.127  Justice Breyer’s international law interpretation,
then, makes good sense.128
But suppose a “domestic law” approach is taken to interpret the ATS.  In
that case, early interpretations of the statute, contemporaneous with its
enactment, may shed important light.  As it happens, U.S. Attorney General
William Bradford in 1795 issued a relevant opinion letter.129  In the words of
120 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670–71, 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 1674; see infra Part V.
122 See supra Section II.C.
123 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
124 Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
125 Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004)).
126 See supra Part I.
127 See William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on
Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 687, 701–11 (2002).
128 See supra Section II.C.
129 Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57 (1795).
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the majority opinion in Kiobel, the Bradford opinion concerned a 1794 case
in which “several U.S. citizens joined a French privateer fleet and attacked
and plundered the British colony of Sierra Leone.”130  In regard to criminal
prosecution of the U.S. citizens, Bradford wrote that, insofar “as the transac-
tions complained of originated or took place in a foreign country, they are
not within the cognizance of our courts.”131  In contrast, in regard to civil
suits under the ATS, Bradford took the opposite view:
But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been
injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of
the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all
cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or
a treaty of the United States . . . .132
In Kiobel the majority distinguished the Bradford opinion—but on
grounds that actually support ATS jurisdiction over acts of U.S. citizens com-
mitted on “foreign shores”:
Attorney General Bradford’s opinion defies a definitive reading and we need
not adopt one here.  Whatever its precise meaning, it deals with U.S. citizens
who, by participating in an attack taking place both on the high seas and on a foreign
shore, violated a treaty . . . .133
Thus, both Bradford and the Kiobel majority grounded ATS jurisdiction
in the 1795 case on the fact that U.S. citizens were the alleged perpetrators.
Bradford saw “no doubt”134 that the ATS granted jurisdiction and a remedy
for an attack by U.S. citizens that took place “both on the high seas and on a
foreign shore.”135  For purposes of Kiobel, a suit against foreign nationals,136
the majority found Bradford’s opinion concerning a case against “U.S. citi-
zens” “hardly suffic[ient] to counter the weighty concerns underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality.”137  But for purposes of ATS suits
130 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1667.
131 Id. (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58 (1795)).
132 Id. at 1668 (quoting Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)).
133 Id. (emphasis added).
134 Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
135 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668.
136 Id. at 1662.
137 Id. at 1668.  Scholar Curtis Bradley likewise reads the Bradford opinion to support
suits only against Americans.  Concluding that the “weight of the evidence” suggests that
Congress “implicitly intended to limit the Alien Tort Statute to suits involving a U.S. citizen
defendant (at least in non-admiralty cases),” he contends that the Bradford opinion “obvi-
ously envisions a suit brought by alien plaintiffs against American citizens,” and “[t]here is
no suggestion in the opinion that the Alien Tort Statute could be used to address similar
acts of hostility committed by foreign citizens, such as the French citizens involved in the
attack.”  Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 635,
637 (2002).  Most recently, Professors Bellia and Clark conclude that the ATS “originally
encompassed claims by aliens against U.S. citizens (but only U.S. citizens) for any tort of
violence against person or personal property, wherever committed.”  Anthony J. Bellia Jr.
& Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1609,
1612 (2014).
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against U.S. citizens for torts committed on foreign shores—the focus both of
Bradford’s opinion and of this Article—Bradford concluded that there is “no
doubt” of ATS jurisdiction.138
Would the majority find the Bradford opinion equally unpersuasive in
an ATS suit against U.S. citizens for torts committed on foreign shores?  The
majority did not specifically address suits against U.S. citizens.139  If it had
done so, only with difficulty could the majority have evaded the plain mean-
ing of the Bradford opinion on this issue.140
The majority did, however, rely on the “weighty concerns” underlying its
approach to interpreting the statute.141  Part IV of this Article turns not only
to those interests, but to the full spectrum of foreign policy and international
law interests at issue in ATS suits against Americans for human rights torts
committed on foreign shores.  It concludes that, subject to the limits dis-
cussed in Part V on a case-by-case basis, the balance of interests generally
supports the exercise of ATS jurisdiction over cases against U.S. nationals,
just as Bradford opined in the case of the U.S. nationals who plundered
Sierra Leone.
IV. COMPETING FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN EXTRATERRITORIAL
ATS JURISDICTION
A. The Role of Foreign Policy Interests in Interpreting the Jurisdictional
Reach of the ATS
At least six foreign policy and international law interests are potentially
at stake in the question of whether the ATS reaches human rights torts com-
mitted by Americans overseas.142  Three tend to weigh against extraterritorial
jurisdiction; three tend to weigh in favor.  They are as follows:
Interests Weighing Against Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
• The territorial interests of foreign sovereign states to govern their
own territories;
• The risk of inter-state conflict resulting from exercises of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction; and
138 See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
139 See supra Section II.A.
140 One might argue that the “high seas” component of Bradford’s opinion was essen-
tial to his view that there was ATS jurisdiction over the torts committed in the “foreign
country.”  But Bradford said nothing to make ATS jurisdiction over terrestrial torts turn on
whether torts were also committed on the high seas.  One might also argue that the tort he
addressed involved a statutory rather than a common law violation.  Again, Bradford said
nothing to suggest that such a distinction would matter. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op.
Att’y Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795).
141 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1668; see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
142 See infra Sections IV.B–C.
2014] suing  americans  for  human  rights  torts  overseas 1791
• The reciprocity risk: the risk that suits might be brought in for-
eign courts against Americans for human rights violations in the
United States or in third countries.143
Interests Weighing in Favor of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
• The U.S. foreign policy interest in human rights accountability
worldwide;
• The right and interest of each state, including the United States,
to police the conduct of its nationals abroad; and
• The internationally recognized right of victims of gross violations
of human rights to effective access to justice, effective remedies,
and reparation.144
In addition, where the ATS plaintiffs are lawful residents of the United
States, a seventh interest—their interest as residents of a U.S. forum—weighs
in favor of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts.145
The divergent views of the Justices on the principal legal issues in
Kiobel—whether to invoke the presumption against extraterritorial applica-
tion of the ATS and whether the ATS reaches extraterritorial torts at all146—
likely reflected the differing weights they assigned to these interests.  The
language of the majority opinion prioritized the first three interests, namely
those weighing against extraterritorial application.147  In contrast, while tak-
ing respectful account of those interests, Justice Breyer’s opinion treated
them in some cases as outweighed, within limits, by U.S. interests in promot-
ing human rights and policing the conduct of U.S. nationals abroad.148
Unfortunately, the text of the opinions gave no clear indication that any
Justice treats the rights of victims to effective remedies, or the interests of
lawful resident aliens in a U.S. forum, as relevant to the extraterritorial reach
of the ATS.149  Despite their relevance, these interests thus appear to have no
value in explaining the divergent views of the Justices in Kiobel.150  If and
when the issue of ATS jurisdiction over torts committed by American nation-
als abroad is squarely presented in a future case, the Justices should clarify
these seeming omissions.
The rights of victims to effective remedies are at stake in all ATS cases.
In contrast, the interests of lawful resident alien plaintiffs are at stake only
where, as in Kiobel and Filartiga, the alien plaintiffs happen to reside in the
United States.151  The Kiobel Court implicitly deemed those plaintiffs’ inter-
143 See infra Section IV.B.
144 See infra Section IV.C.
145 See infra subsection IV.C.4.
146 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–65, 1669.
147 See infra Section IV.B.
148 See infra Sections IV.C and Part V.
149 See infra subsections IV.C.3–4.
150 See infra subsections IV.C.3–4.
151 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662–63; Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir.
1980).
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ests as residents not sufficient to justify ATS jurisdiction over a case that oth-
erwise had no connection to the United States.152  But in ATS cases against
U.S. nationals, if the plaintiffs reside in the United States, that fact (as
explained below) should count as an additional interest supporting the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.153
The following text considers each of these seven interests in turn.
B. Interests Tending to Weigh Against Extraterritorial Application
1. Sovereign Territory
The interest of foreign sovereigns in governing their own territories is
obvious, but should not be overstated.  It was most strenuously asserted
before the Kiobel Court in the amicus brief of four former State Department
legal advisers.154  They observed that the presumption against extraterritorial
application of statutes reflects, “[a]t the international law level, the principle
of territory.”155  The territorial principle, they argued, “has been described as
‘perhaps the fundamental concept of international law,’ because it gives
meaning to the crucial concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction.”156  Reach-
ing back to Chief Justice John Jay’s explanation in 1793 “that ‘every nation is,
and ought to be, perfectly and absolutely sovereign within its own dominions
to the entire exclusion of all foreign power, interference and jurisdic-
tion,’”157 the former legal advisers also cited an 1812 Supreme Court deci-
sion, which described “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own
territory” as “necessarily exclusive and absolute.”158
But even if exclusive and absolute territorial sovereignty had been the
law two centuries ago,159 it is no longer the law and has not been for decades.
For example, like most nations, the United States is now party to treaties that
prohibit—including on our own territory—genocide,160 torture,161 and sys-
152 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669; infra subsection IV.C.4.
153 See infra subsection IV.C.4.
154 Brief of Former State Dep’t Legal Advisers as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at app. 1, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)
[hereinafter Legal Advisers Amicus Brief].
155 Id. at 6–7.
156 Id. at 7 (quoting 1 D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (2d ed. 1970)).
157 Id. (quoting Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (charge
given to grand jury on circuit)).
158 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)).
159 It was not.  If it had been, Attorney General Bradford could not have written his
opinion in the Sierra Leone case; Britain, as the territorial sovereign of its colony, would
have had exclusive jurisdiction over the torts committed in Sierra Leone. See Schooner
Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136 (“[A]ll sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in
practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete juris-
diction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.”).
160 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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tematic racial discrimination.162  Even on the territory of states that choose
not to join those treaties, such heinous acts are prohibited by customary
international law.163  States in the twenty-first century no longer enjoy (if
they ever did) “exclusive and absolute” territorial sovereignty—especially in
cases of gross violations of human rights.
Perhaps the legal advisers meant only to characterize the state of the law
at the time the ATS was enacted in 1789.  But their brief implied otherwise.
The principle of absolute sovereignty, they wrote, “long has been ingrained
in our [nation’s] jurisprudence.”164  They did not mention that the principle
had also long been abandoned.  Otherwise the human rights treaties cited
above165 could not have been adopted.
Not surprisingly, no Justice in Kiobel expressly relied on the anachronis-
tic doctrine of (nearly) absolute territorial sovereignty.166  True, the majority
counseled against imposing “the sovereign will of the United States onto con-
duct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign.”167
However, its repeatedly stated concern was not so much the intrusion on
sovereignty per se, as the resulting “foreign policy consequences”168—
namely the “‘possibilities of international discord . . . and retaliative
action.’”169
The Kiobel majority also quoted Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. for “the
‘presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule
the world.’”170  While that phrase fit the U.S. securities laws at issue in Morri-
son v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,171 it does not fit the ATS.  The ATS is a
jurisdictional statute which authorizes federal courts to recognize causes of
action for certain violations of treaties or the law of nations.172  When ATS
judges rule on torts committed in another nation, the substantive norms they
161 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
162 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
163 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Feb. 5) (explaining that “obligations of a State towards the international community as a
whole”—or “obligations erga omnes” may “derive . . . from the principles and rules concern-
ing the basic rights of the human person,” among other sources, and “all States can be
held to have a legal interest in their protection”).
164 Legal Advisers Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 7.
165 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text.
166 See supra Sections II.A–C.
167 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1667 (2013).
168 Id. at 1664, 1667, 1669.
169 Id. at 1664 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)).
170 Id. (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
171 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875–76, 2883 (2010) (“Even if that were not true, when a statute
provides for some extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality
operates to limit that provision to its terms.” (citing Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 455–56)).
172 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
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apply are not American laws, as in Morrison, but international law, equally
binding on the foreign nation.173
That is not to suggest that foreign nations have no sovereign interest in
adjudicating what goes on in their territories.  They plainly do, and some-
times that interest is greater than that of the United States.  But in cases
where U.S. interests in adjudication prevail—as in suits against U.S. nation-
als174—the legitimate interests of foreign sovereigns can be adequately
addressed on a case-by-case basis by the limiting principles discussed in Part V
below without shutting down ATS extraterritorial jurisdiction altogether,175
especially in situations where victims would otherwise have no effective access
to justice or remedy.176  Both human rights and sovereignty interests can
often be reasonably accommodated, but only on a case-by-case basis, not by
blanket assertions or denials of jurisdiction.
The point was well made by the United States as amicus in Kiobel.  Urg-
ing the Court not to “articulate a categorical rule” against extraterritorial
ATS causes of action, the Justice Department stated the government’s posi-
tion: there are indeed “circumstances in which” ATS causes of action for
overseas torts “would be appropriate,” and the question “calls for an assess-
ment of a variety of factors and does not necessarily lead to one uniform
conclusion.”177
2. International Discord
The risk that extraterritorial adjudication may lead to serious interna-
tional discord is real in some cases.  For example, if U.S. courts were to hear
an ATS case against a Chinese official for violating the right of Tibetans to
self-determination, tensions between the world’s two leading powers could
rise significantly.178
173 The Kiobel majority clarified that
[t]he question under Sosa is not whether a federal court has jurisdiction to enter-
tain a cause of action provided by foreign or even international law.  The ques-
tion is instead whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action
under U.S. law to enforce a norm of international law.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666.  Be that as it may, the substantive norm being enforced in an ATS
human rights case is not one that was defined by the United States and then imposed on a
foreign sovereign.  The norm is rather one defined by the international community, of
which both the United States and the foreign sovereign are equally members, and which
governs conduct equally in the foreign state as in the United States.
174 See supra Part I; infra Section IV.C .
175 See infra Part V.
176 See infra subsection IV.C.3.
177 Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of
Affirmance at 4, 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491) [hereinafter Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief].
178 Cf. Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266–67, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (noting that the
State Department advised the court that “potentially serious adverse foreign policy conse-
quences” could result from adjudicating ATS suit brought by Falun Gong practitioners
against Chinese officials (quoting Letter from William H. Taft, IV, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of
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But there can be and have been cases where adjudicating an extraterrito-
rial ATS suit poses no meaningful threat to U.S. foreign policy interests,
including our interest in avoiding international discord.  For example, the
State Department voiced no objection to, and even went so far as to support,
ATS suits for human rights torts committed in Paraguay in the Filartiga case
in 1980,179 in Bosnia in the Kadic case in 1995,180 in Burma in the Unocal
case in 1997,181 and in Somalia in the Samantar case in 2010.182  In none of
these cases did the ensuing ATS litigation lead to significant diplomatic or
international discord.
The State Department reaffirmed its support of the case-by-case princi-
ple in 2012.  In Kiobel, the United States informed the Supreme Court that
the State Department adheres to the view that “after weighing the various
considerations, allowing suits based on conduct occurring in a foreign coun-
try in the circumstances presented in Filartiga is consistent with the foreign
relations interests of the United States, including the promotion of respect
for human rights.”183
Again, the answer is case-by-case resolution.  In some cases the interna-
tional discord feared by the majority may well materialize; in others it may
not.  For example, other nations are less likely to object to suits against U.S.
nationals, especially where the U.S. nationals are sued exclusively or as princi-
pals.  There is no need to throw the baby out with the bath water.
3. Retaliation
The majority also feared that allowing suits like Kiobel “would imply that
other nations, also applying the law of nations, could hale our citizens into
their courts for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the
United States, or anywhere else in the world.”184
Whatever the merits of this point in Kiobel—a suit against foreign corpo-
rations—it has no application to ATS jurisdiction over torts committed
abroad by Americans.  We could hardly object if foreign states were to follow
our example and exercise jurisdiction over human rights violations commit-
ted outside their territories by their own citizens.
State, to Robert D. McCallum, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 7–8
(Sept. 25, 2002))).
179 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22–23, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090).
180 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 250 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1995).
181 Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335, 362
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
182 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 1, Samantar
v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305 (2010) (No. 08-1555).
183 Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at 4–5, 13.
184 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
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C. Interests Tending to Weigh in Favor of Extraterritorial Application
Of the interests that concerned the majority, only sovereignty and poten-
tial international discord—and not the fear of retaliation—may thus be rele-
vant in cases against American nationals for torts committed abroad.  Yet
concerns for sovereignty and discord must be balanced against other inter-
ests that support extraterritorial jurisdiction.  In ATS suits against Americans
for serious human rights violations overseas, the interests supporting the
exercise of jurisdiction generally prevail, subject to the limits set forth in Part
V below on a case-by-case basis.
1. American Foreign Policy on Human Rights
Perhaps the weightiest interest favoring extraterritorial ATS claims
against American nationals is the U.S. foreign policy commitment to world-
wide respect for human rights and accountability for violations.
As observed by the former U.S. diplomats whom this writer had the
honor to represent before the Supreme Court in Kiobel,185
America’s foreign policy commitment to respect for [sic] human rights
worldwide is longstanding and bipartisan.  United States law declares that “a
principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote
the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all
countries.”186
The diplomats continued, “In 1992 President Bush reiterated ‘our commit-
ment to ensuring that human rights are respected everywhere.’”187  This spe-
cifically includes a commitment to accountability:
In 2009 Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed that our “commitment to
human rights starts with universal standards and with holding everyone
accountable to those standards.”  Similar statements have been made by
Administrations of both parties over the last four decades.188
The foreign policy risks of ATS adjudication must therefore be balanced
against the foreign policy benefits.  This was recognized by the State Depart-
ment three decades ago in Filartiga.189  Where there is international consen-
sus on a protected human right, and on the scope of protection, the
Department advised,
there is little danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy
efforts.  To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in
185 Diplomats Amicus Brief, supra note 23.
186 Id. at 10 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (2006)).
187 Id. (quoting Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 1
PUB. PAPERS 437, 438 (Mar. 12, 1992)).
188 Id. (quoting Hilary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Remarks on the Human
Rights Agenda for the 21st Century, Georgetown University (Dec. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2009a/12/133544.htm).
189 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation’s
commitment to the protection of human rights.190
In 2012 the State Department reaffirmed this view.  As noted above, the
United States informed the Supreme Court in Kiobel of the Department’s
view that ATS suits based on “conduct occurring in a foreign country,” in the
circumstances of Filartiga, are “consistent with the foreign relations interests
of the United States, including the promotion of respect for human
rights.”191
Of course, the balance does not come out in favor of allowing suits in
every case.  Sometimes other foreign policy risks outweigh the potential
human rights gains.  As the United States rightly argued in Kiobel, the assess-
ment must be made on a case-by-case basis.192  Courts should take into
account the views of the State Department in deciding whether to allow par-
ticular ATS cases to proceed.  In contrast, adopting a blanket rule against
extraterritorial ATS cases—as Justices Alito and Thomas would do explicitly,
and as the majority opinion has already been misread to require193—would
deprive the United States of the foreign policy benefits, in appropriate cases
against U.S. tortfeasors, of affording foreign victims what may be their only
opportunity to be heard before independent courts.
2. Policing Nationals Abroad
As noted in Part I above, international law has long recognized the right
of each nation, within limits of reasonability, to adjudicate and recognize
claims against its nationals for serious misconduct abroad.
This is not merely a right, but also an interest of each nation.  For exam-
ple, as Germany’s amicus brief before the Supreme Court in Kiobel rightly
contended, “Germany has an inherent interest in applying its laws and using
its courts in cases in which German defendants are accused of the violation of
international customary laws.”194
With respect to corporate defendants, this right and interest also reflect
contemporary international best practice.  The United Nations Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights, endorsed by consensus of the UN Human
Rights Council in 2011, provides in Principle 2 that “States should set out
clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their terri-
tory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their
operations.”195
190 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 179, at 22–23.
191 Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at 13.
192 Id. at 4, 6.
193 See the cases discussed in supra Section II.D.
194 Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 10, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491)
[hereinafter German Amicus Brief].
195 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, Human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises, 17th Sess., July 6, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at 1
(July 6, 2011); Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General, Guiding Principles on
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The Commentary to the Guiding Principles elaborates:
At present States are not generally required under international human
rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in
their territory and/or jurisdiction.  Nor are they generally prohibited from
doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.  Within these
parameters some human rights treaty bodies recommend that home States
take steps to prevent abuse abroad by business enterprises within their
jurisdiction.196
Why should states police their businesses operating abroad?  The Com-
mentary explains:
There are strong policy reasons for home States to set out clearly the expec-
tation that businesses respect human rights abroad. . . . The reasons include
ensuring predictability for business enterprises by providing coherent and consistent
messages, and preserving the State’s own reputation.197
How should states hold their companies accountable for conduct over-
seas?  The Commentary informs:
States have adopted a range of approaches in this regard.  Some are domes-
tic measures with extraterritorial implications. . . . Other approaches amount
to direct extraterritorial legislation and enforcement.198
In cases of American companies, then, ATS jurisdiction over their
alleged involvement in human rights violations abroad is supported not only
by the U.S. foreign policy interest in human rights accountability, but also by
the interest of every state and international best practice in policing the seri-
ous misconduct of its citizens and companies abroad.
These elements were missing in the Kiobel suit against foreign corpora-
tions.  Had Kiobel instead been a suit against American companies, the balance
of foreign policy interests, and their reflection in the Court’s statutory inter-
pretation of the ATS, should have tipped the other way.199  Put in the major-
ity’s terms, a suit against an American company (or business executive) for
serious human rights violations in another country sufficiently “touches and
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights].
196 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 195, at 7.
197 Id. (emphasis added).
198 Id.
199 Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965, slip op. at 18–19 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (“With
respect to a corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of business are
‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.’  Those affiliations have the virtue of being
unique . . .  as well as easily ascertainable.  These bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least
one clear and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all
claims.” (citations omitted)).  The United States as amicus in Kiobel rightly stated that, in
the circumstances of that suit against foreign defendants, the Court need not decide
whether a common law cause of action should be recognized under the ATS “where the
defendant is a U.S. national or corporation.”  Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note
177, at 21.
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concerns” the United States to justify federal courts recognition of a cause of
action under the jurisdictional grant of the ATS.  However, the limits dis-
cussed in Part V below should also be considered on a case-by-case basis.
3. Victims’ Rights to Effective Remedies
None of the Kiobel opinions gave explicit weight to the rights of victims
of gross violations of human rights to effective access to justice, effective rem-
edies, and reparations.  These remedial rights are recognized internationally
by such instruments as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights200 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,201 a treaty to which
the United States is a party.202  The most recent broad articulation, adopted
without dissent by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005, recognizes
victims’ rights to “effective access to justice” and to “adequate, effective,
prompt and appropriate remedies, including reparation.”203
The Court’s neglect of these rights and interests was unfortunate.
Although the Kiobel plaintiffs were Nigerian citizens, allegedly victimized by
foreign corporations in Nigeria, they had taken refuge in the United States,
where they were lawful residents, having been granted political asylum.204  If
no remedy was available to them in U.S. courts, where were they supposed to
secure an effective remedy?  In Nigeria—the country from which they had
fled persecution, and whose courts were effectively closed to human rights
claims during and after the violations at issue?205  Or in London or The
Hague—home capitals of the (wealthy) defendant corporations, but inconve-
200 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).  Article 8 of the Declaration provides: “Everyone has the right to
an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental
rights granted him by the constitution or by law.” Id. at 73.
201 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 161.  Article 2.3 of
the Covenant provides:
Each State Party . . . undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or
freedoms . . . are violated shall have an effective remedy . . . ; (b) To ensure that
any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other com-
petent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the
possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall
enforce such remedies when granted.
Id. at 174.
202 The United States ratified the Covenant on June 8, 1992. See International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Feb. 7, 2014).
203 G.A. Res. 60/147, at 4, 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (adopting Basic
Principles and Guidelines 2(c), 11(a), and 11(b)).
204 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013).
205 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights noted:
[A]t the time of submitting this communication [in 1996], the then Military gov-
ernment of Nigeria had enacted various decrees ousting the jurisdiction of the
courts and thus depriving the people in Nigeria of the right to seek redress in the
courts for acts of government that violate their fundamental human rights.
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niently located an ocean away from where the (presumably not wealthy)
plaintiffs now reside in the United States?
One might argue that the victims’ interest—by itself—is insufficient to
outweigh the sovereignty and discord interests against extraterritorial ATS
jurisdiction.  But the victims’ internationally recognized interest in effective
remedies should at least be given explicit weight, not ignored.
Perhaps the omission of a reference to victims’ rights in the Kiobel opin-
ions reflected the fact that ATS plaintiffs, as required by the text of the stat-
ute, are necessarily “aliens.”  The Justices may have felt no obligation to
weigh the interests of aliens in effective access to justice.  If so, the rationale
was flawed.  Aside from the U.S. foreign policy commitment to worldwide
human rights accountability (as described above in subsection IV.C.1), the
United States is party to several treaties that commit it “to promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms.”206  Under Arti-
cle VI of the Constitution, those treaties are part of the “supreme Law of the
Land.”207  Even if not self-executing, they justify taking account of the inter-
ests of victims of human rights violations committed abroad in access to
justice.208
4. Interests of Lawful Resident Aliens in a U.S. Forum
The right of victims to effective remedies weighs in favor of extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction under the ATS, even where the alien plaintiffs reside abroad,
but are denied effective access to justice in their home countries.  However,
when the alien plaintiffs happen to reside lawfully in the United States, as in
Filartiga and Kiobel, the weight of their interest in a U.S. forum is enhanced.
While their U.S. residency in Kiobel, by itself, was not enough to outweigh the
interests weighing against jurisdiction in that foreign-cubed case, it should
have been considered (along with their right to effective remedies) as a fac-
tor weighing in favor of U.S. jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, although the majority noted that “[f]ollowing the alleged
atrocities, [the Kiobel plaintiffs] moved to the United States where they have
been granted political asylum and now reside as legal residents,”209 its rea-
soning took no account of these facts.  Nor did Justice Breyer mention them.
These omissions deserve reconsideration in an appropriate future case.
Granted, lawful residency does not confer the same “passive personality”
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center
(SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) / Nigeria, at ¶ 41, 155/96 (Oct. 27,
2001) (citing The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1993).
206 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 161, at 173 (“Con-
sidering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote uni-
versal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms.”).  The same obligation
is embodied in Article 55(c) of the United Nations Charter.  U.N. Charter art. 55.
207 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
208 See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 695, 719–20 (1995).
209 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
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jurisdiction exercisable by states when their citizens are victimized by serious
wrongs committed outside their territories.210  Yet lawful residency is none-
theless relevant to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction in both domes-
tic and international law and practice.
In domestic law, a plaintiff’s U.S. residency weighs against dismissal
based on forum non conveniens.  “[L]awful U.S. residence can be a meaningful
factor supporting the plaintiff’s choice of a U.S. forum,” because the greater
her ties to the United States, “the more likely it is that the plaintiff would be
inconvenienced by a requirement to bring the claim in a foreign jurisdic-
tion.”211  This is especially true in human rights suits under the ATS against
an American defendant for aiding and abetting foreign human rights viola-
tions.  Because such suits may “assert outrageous conduct on the part of
another nation,” they may be ill-received by that nation’s courts.212
International law on jurisdiction treats residency as relevant not so much
because of the plaintiff’s convenience, but because of state interests in adju-
dicating the rights and obligations of their residents.  Thus the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, in addressing jurisdiction to adjudicate, states,
“In general, a state’s exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a
person . . . is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted: . . . the person,
if a natural person, is resident in the state.”213
A similar view was implicit in the joint separate opinion in Congo v.
Belgium of the British, Dutch and American judges on the International
Court of Justice.  They opined that an exercise of universal jurisdiction in
absentia should be predicated on “some special circumstance[ ],” such as that
“persons related to the victims of the case will have requested the commence-
ment of legal proceedings.”214  They no doubt had in mind the case before
them, in which seven of the twelve complainants in the Belgian criminal pro-
ceedings were residents, but not citizens, of Belgium.215
210 E.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 63
(Feb. 14); (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal) (“Pas-
sive personality jurisdiction, for so long regarded as controversial, is now reflected . . . in
the legislation of various countries . . . , and today meets with relatively little opposition, at
least so far as a particular category of offences is concerned.”).  The United States asserts
passive personality jurisdiction in various legislation. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006)
(“Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by
reason of an act of international terrorism . . . may sue therefor in any appropriate district
court of the United States . . . .”).
211 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 n.23 (1981) (“Citizens or residents deserve some-
what more deference than foreign plaintiffs [in choice of forum].” (emphasis added)).
212 Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 106.
213 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 421(2)(C) (1987).
214 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 63, 81 (Feb.
14) (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal).
215 Id. at 9 (judgment).
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The interests of lawful residents are also relevant to extraterritorial juris-
diction in the laws of several European states.  In cases where extreme cir-
cumstances render a foreign forum unavailable, the “forum of necessity”
doctrine allows Dutch courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction so long
as there is a “sufficient connection” with the Netherlands, “for example, if
the plaintiff has his or her habitual residence in the Netherlands.”216  In one
such case, Dutch courts took jurisdiction over a suit by a Bulgarian against
Libyans for acts that took place in Libya because the Bulgarian “resided in
the Netherlands.”217  At least ten European states have such “forum of neces-
sity” jurisdictional rules.218
The point may be illustrated by the reverse situation.  Suppose the plain-
tiffs in Kiobel had remained in Nigeria and had never come to the United
States.  Would that circumstance not strengthen the argument against U.S.
courts exercising jurisdiction?
The interests of lawful residents do not, by themselves, suffice to justify
extraterritorial ATS jurisdiction.  But where other interests support extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction—as in human rights suits against American nationals—
the interest of lawful resident plaintiffs in a U.S. forum adds to their collec-
tive weight.219
D. Conclusion on the Balance of Competing Interests
The balance of interests generally favors extraterritorial jurisdiction over
ATS claims against Americans.  However, in view of the limits discussed in
Part V below, the weight of competing interests may sometimes tilt against
jurisdiction in a particular case.  Those limits can most accurately be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.
216 UK Dutch Amicus Brief, supra note 39, at 22.
217 Id. at 22–23.
218 See EU Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 24 n.66 (noting the “forum necessitatis” doc-
trine).  Canadian courts refer to the doctrine in English as “forum of necessity.”  Club
Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, para. 59 (Can.) (noting that “forum of
necessity” doctrine is an “exceptional basis” for jurisdiction in Canada).
219 Cf. THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 32 (2001).  Principle 8, a
“Resolution of Competing National Jurisdictions” states:
Where more than one state has or may assert jurisdiction over a person and
where the state that has custody of the person has no basis for jurisdiction other
than the principle of universality, that state or its judicial organs shall, in deciding
whether to prosecute or extradite, base their decision on an aggregate balance of
the following criteria: . . . (d) the nationality connection of the victim to the
requesting state; (e) any other connection between the requesting state and the alleged . . .
victim . . . .
Id. (emphasis added).  The Princeton Principles are an unofficial set of recommendations
made by a group of experts assembled by the Program on Law and Public Affairs of
Princeton University. See generally id.
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V. LIMITS ON ATS SUITS AGAINST AMERICANS FOR
TORTS COMMITTED ABROAD
Not every ATS suit against an American national for an overseas human
rights tort should be heard by U.S. courts.  In a given case, interests of
respect for foreign sovereignty, U.S. foreign policy interests, fairness to
defendants, or judicial efficiency may counsel against exercising ATS
jurisdiction.220
The determination is best made by courts on a case-by-case basis by
applying, in appropriate cases, the doctrines suggested by Justice Breyer,
namely exhaustion of foreign remedies, forum non conveniens, comity toward
foreign sovereigns, and due deference to the foreign policy views of the exec-
utive branch.221
These limiting principles were already suggested in Sosa.222  The Court
there noted that it would “certainly consider” an exhaustion requirement in
an appropriate case, and that in some cases there is a “strong argument” for
courts to give “serious weight” to the foreign policy views of the executive.223
Concurring in Sosa, Justice Breyer added that he would ask whether a partic-
ular exercise of ATS jurisdiction “is consistent with those notions of comity
that lead each nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limit-
ing the reach of its laws and their enforcement.”224
Neither Sosa nor Justice Breyer’s concurrences in Sosa and Kiobel
reached the issues of the definition of these limits on the exercise of jurisdic-
tion, or of the exceptions to these limits, either generally or in the specific
context of ATS suits against American nationals.  Confusion on the definition
of the limits and the exceptions was evident in various amicus briefs submit-
ted to the Court in Kiobel.  Yet where extraterritorial ATS jurisdiction is justi-
fied prima facie—as in suits against American nationals for torts committed
abroad—both the limits and the exceptions to the limits must be carefully
220 The Restatement provides generally that, even when a jurisdictional basis such as
nationality exists, a state should not exercise jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity
“having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasona-
ble.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(1) (1987).  The Restatement lists a host of factors relevant to reasonableness, includ-
ing, among others, links of territory and nationality, the nature of the regulated activity
and its importance to the forum state and to the international legal system, and the inter-
ests of other states and the likelihood of conflict with their interests. Id. § 403(2).  Where
two states both have jurisdictional interests in a matter, they should each evaluate their
respective interests “in light of all the relevant factors,” and defer to the state with the
greater interest. Id. § 403(3).  Justice Breyer’s approach, by applying the doctrines of
exhaustion, forum non conveniens, comity, and deference, is a way of meeting these general
requirements of reasonableness in the context of ATS suits against U.S. nationals for torts
committed on the territory of another state.
221 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671, 1674 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
222 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
223 Id. at 733 n.21.
224 Id. at 761 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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considered.  Otherwise the limits may be applied in an overbroad manner,
defeating the very jurisdiction and causes of action whose importance is
rightly recognized by Justice Breyer.  The following discussion focuses on
their application to ATS suits against American nationals for torts committed
on foreign shores.
A. Exhaustion of Foreign Remedies
1. Whether To Require Exhaustion
In Sosa the Court stated that it would consider an exhaustion require-
ment in an “appropriate” case.225  Justice Breyer opined separately that
exhaustion “might” be required,226 a view he reiterated in Kiobel.227  The
Ninth Circuit en banc read the references in Sosa to support a prudential
exhaustion requirement, most likely to be imposed where the nexus to the
United States is weak and the norm allegedly violated is not universal.228
In cases against Americans, the nexus to the United States, by definition,
is strong.  Under the Ninth Circuit’s rationale, on that ground alone, exhaus-
tion might be excused, all the more so when the alleged violation is—as it
must be for ATS claims—universal.  Yet in suggesting a possible exhaustion
requirement in Kiobel, Justice Breyer had in mind only cases “where distinct
American interests are at issue”229—including cases against American
defendants.230  Under his rationale, then, exhaustion might be required
even where the nexus to the United States is strong.
On the other hand, his statement that exhaustion “might” be required
need not require its presence in every case.  Whether to require exhaustion
might depend on the balance of adjudicative interests between the foreign
state and the United States.  For example, a foreign state would have a
greater adjudicative interest where an American is sued for aiding and abet-
ting an agency or officer of that state than where the American is sued exclu-
sively or as a principal.  Exhaustion might appropriately be required only
where Americans are sued as accomplices, but not where they are sued as
principals, and still less when they are sued as the sole perpetrators.231
225 Id. at 733 n.21 (majority opinion).
226 Id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
227 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring).
228 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 754–55 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citing Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 828–32 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)), vacated on other grounds,
133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
229 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 1674–76.
231 Cf. id. at 1678 (rejecting ATS jurisdiction in Kiobel in part because plaintiffs alleged,
“not that the [foreign] defendants directly engaged [in human rights violations], but that
they helped others (who are not American nationals) to do so”).
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2. Exceptions to Exhaustion
Even where an exhaustion requirement is imposed, both domestic and
international law recognize that it is subject to exceptions.232  Several amici
in Kiobel, in arguing for an exhaustion requirement, recognized exceptions.
But their formulations were neither consistent nor complete.  They would
variously excuse exhaustion where foreign remedies are “futile,”233 “unavaila-
ble,”234 “clearly sham or inadequate, or their application is unreasonably pro-
longed,”235 or not “adequate and available,”236 or where the local forum is
“unwilling or unable to provide relief,”237 or where that forum is in a country
with a “proven record of human rights violations and no due process.”238
With so many candidate criteria, there is a risk that the exceptions might
be applied in an inconsistent or incomplete manner.  For the sake of uni-
formity and fairness, courts would do well to follow Justice Breyer’s lead and
look to established “norms of international law” in determining the jurisdic-
tional reach of the ATS.239
A good international law set of standards is set forth in the widely cited
and globally influential judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in Velásquez Rodrı́guez v. Honduras.240  The Inter-American Court inter-
preted the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights241 gov-
erning exhaustion of domestic remedies before cases may be taken to the
Inter-American Commission.  The Convention requires, first, that domestic
remedies have been exhausted “in accordance with generally recognized
principles of international law.”242  It then specifies three exceptions to the
requirement of exhaustion:
a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process
of law for the protection of the right . . . ;
232 In domestic law, see, for example, Sarei, 550 F.3d at 830 (noting exceptions to
exhaustion where foreign remedies were “‘ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged,
inadequate, or obviously futile’” (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5
(9th Cir. 1996))).
233 Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at 24 n.12.
234 EU Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 30.
235 Id. at 31 n.78 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 713 cmt. f (1987)).
236 Id. at 35 n.89 (quoting Torture Victims Protection Act § 2(b), Pub. L. No. 102-256,
106 Stat. 73 (1992)).
237 Id. at 26.
238 Id. at 32 n.82 (quoting German Amicus Brief, supra note 194, at 13).
239 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
240 Velásquez-Rodrı́guez v. Honduras, Merits Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
4 (July 29, 1988), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_04_
ing.pdf.
241 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
242 Id. art. 46.1.a.
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b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the reme-
dies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or
c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the
aforementioned remedies.243
In addition to these three exceptions—lack of due process, denial of
access, and unwarranted delay—the Inter-American Court interpreted the
“generally recognized principles of international law” on exhaustion to
require that domestic remedies be both “adequate” and “effective.”244
“Adequate” remedies are “those which are suitable to address an
infringement of a legal right.”245  Thus, a civil proceeding to obtain “a pre-
sumptive finding of death based on disappearance, the purpose of which is to
allow heirs to dispose of the estate . . . or to allow the spouse to remarry, is
not an adequate remedy for finding a person or for obtaining his liberty.”246
Similarly, a foreign criminal proceeding that does not include a remedy of
monetary compensation, or that can be initiated only by the state, would not
be an adequate remedy for victims seeking reparations for human rights vio-
lations in an ATS civil suit.
In contrast, an “effective” remedy is one that is “capable of producing
the result for which it was designed.”247  For example, the foreign jurisdic-
tion may, in theory, allow tort suits against government officials, but if the
officials control or intimidate the courts, or defy court orders, the foreign
remedy is not effective.
In order to require exhaustion, then, all five tests must be met: domestic
remedies must be adequate, effective, consistent with due process of law,
accessible, and not unduly delayed.
These tests have the virtue of objectivity.  They are thus preferable to the
subjective standards—for example, that domestic authorities are “unwilling”
to bring genuine prosecutions—incorporated in the statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC).248  Not only are subjective assessments difficult,
243 Id. art. 46.2.a–c (emphasis added).
244 Velásquez-Rodrı́guez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (Ser. C) No. 4 at ¶¶ 63–64, 66.
245 Id. ¶ 64.
246 Id.
247 Id. ¶ 66.
248 Cases are inadmissible before the ICC except where national authorities are “unwill-
ing or unable” to conduct genuine investigations or prosecutions.  Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 17.1(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  “Unwilling” is
defined with subjective elements.  One or more of the following must exist:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was
made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility
. . . ;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circum-
stances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or
impartially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the
circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Id. art. 17.2(a)–(c) (emphasis added).
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especially from afar, they also raise serious issues of comity among nations.
For an American court to rule (and to have to rule) on whether foreign
authorities have acted in bad faith would be far less respectful to a foreign
sovereign than ruling, for example, on whether a foreign proceeding has
been unduly delayed.
In addition, like ATS tort suits, the Velásquez standards for exhaustion
are designed precisely for civil suits seeking reparations.  In contrast, criminal
prosecutions before the ICC are more deferential to the interests of states in
prosecuting their own citizens.249
B. Forum Non Conveniens
The doctrine of forum non conveniens merits only a limited role in ATS
human rights suits against American defendants.  The doctrine should be
applied only where the foreign forum meets all the Velásquez standards for
exhaustion, and where the balance of judicial efficiency, convenience of the
parties, and public policy clearly favors the foreign forum.  Only then can a
forum non conveniens dismissal be consistent with the right of victims to effec-
tive access to justice and with U.S. foreign policy favoring human rights
accountability.
Unfortunately, the usual formulation of the doctrine (for tort cases gen-
erally) is too permissive in regard to the adequacy of the foreign forum to
meet these criteria (for ATS human rights cases against Americans).  The
general U.S. test for adequacy of the foreign forum is ordinarily satisfied sim-
ply “when the defendant is ‘amenable to process’ in the other jurisdic-
tion.”250  Only in “rare circumstances” would a foreign remedy be so “clearly
unsatisfactory” as to be deemed inadequate.251
In human rights cases against Americans, relegating victims to a foreign
forum, so long as it is not “clearly unsatisfactory,” accords too little weight to
the victims’ right to effective, and not merely formal or theoretical, access to
justice.252  Yet the United States’ amicus in Kiobel, far from raising the stan-
dard of adequacy, would lower it: “For reasons of comity among nations, in
249 Because of the harsher nature of criminal jurisdiction, its exhaustion requirements
are stricter than those for civil jurisdiction. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 reporters’ note 8 (1987) (“It is generally
accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdic-
tion over activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly
than civil jurisdiction over the same activity, and only upon strong justification.”).  Simi-
larly, ICC standards require not only that national remedies fail to comport with due pro-
cess, as in the Velásquez test, but also that they are inconsistent with an intent to do justice,
i.e., they are administered in bad faith.
250 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)).
251 Id.
252 Cf. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that
the Torture Victims Protection Act expresses a policy of favoring exercise of ATS jurisdic-
tion in foreign torture cases, unless the forum non conveniens factors otherwise “tilt strongly”
in favor of foreign trial (citation omitted)).
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suits based on the ATS, assertions that a foreign judicial system is inadequate
should not be accepted absent a very clear and persuasive showing.”253  (The
United States’ amicus, however, was not specifically addressing ATS suits
against Americans.)
In contrast, under the Canadian approach to forum non conveniens, even
in cases not involving human rights, the defendant has the burden to show
that a foreign forum is “clearly more appropriate.”254  Whatever standard
U.S. courts may apply outside the human rights context, the Canadian
approach is preferable in ATS suits against Americans for human rights
violations.
Moreover, the adequacy of the foreign forum should be assessed in light
of the five factors of the Velásquez test for exhaustion of national remedies
(remedies must be adequate, effective, consistent with due process of law,
accessible, and not unduly delayed).  Although utilized in Velásquez to assess
the adequacy of national vs. international fora, these five factors are equally
valid to assess the adequacy of a foreign vs. a domestic (U.S.) forum.
C. Comity Among Nations
Comity is a doctrine of mutual respect among nations, by which one
nation may refrain from applying its laws or adjudicating where another
nation has sovereign interests.  The goal is to make sure that the potentially
conflicting laws of different nations will work together in harmony.255
Comity thus potentially comes into play in extraterritorial ATS litigation.
However, it plays a far lesser role in ATS suits against American nationals.  As
Justice Breyer explained in Sosa, “These comity concerns normally do not
arise (or at least are mitigated) if the conduct in question . . . involves [the
forum] country’s own national.”256  In such cases, the forum country (the
United States in ATS cases) has both a right and an interest in policing its
own nationals, and it may generally do so without passing judgment on the
conduct of foreign authorities.
While this is generally true where Americans are the sole tortfeasors, the
picture is more complicated when they are alleged to have acted in associa-
tion with foreign nationals (and even with the foreign sovereign itself),
whether as participants in a joint criminal enterprise, aiders and abettors, or
253 Supplemental U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 177, at 25.  The United States in Filar-
tiga likewise proposed that a “very clear and persuasive showing” be required to hear the
case in the United States.  Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 179, at 25 n.48.  But in Filartiga, the United States noted, the defendant was a foreign
national who had fled U.S. jurisdiction, leaving “little contact” between the United States
and the parties and alleged conduct. Id.  If the defendant had instead been a U.S.
national, a less stringent showing of the inadequacy of the foreign forum would have been
warranted.
254 Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, paras. 108–09 (Can.).
255 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 723–24 (2004); id. at 761 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
256 Id. at 761 (Breyer, J. concurring).
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otherwise.  In such cases, it may be difficult for an American court to adjudi-
cate the alleged wrongdoing of the American national without also rendering
judgment on the conduct of the foreign sovereign or its nationals.  Comity
comes into play.
In some such cases, the answer will be to allow the ATS suit to proceed
anyway.  For example, in the ATS suit against Unocal for allegedly aiding and
abetting torture and slavery by the Burmese military, no U.S. foreign policy
interest counseled against the implied criticism of Burma—a dictatorship on
which the U.S. had imposed sanctions—that would result from a judgment
against Unocal.  The State Department advised the court that adjudicating
the claims against Unocal “would not prejudice or impede the conduct of
U.S. foreign relations with the current government of Burma.”257
In other cases the potential embarrassment of a foreign sovereign, and
attendant foreign policy consequences, can be avoided by judicial manage-
ment tools.  An example is provided by an ATS suit against several oil compa-
nies, including one partially owned by the Indonesian government, for gross
violations of human rights allegedly committed in Indonesia by their security
force contractor—namely the Indonesian military.258  The court noted the
State Department’s warning that adjudication of the suit would “risk a poten-
tially serious adverse impact on significant interests of the United States.”259
However, as summarized by the court, the State Department qualified its
assessment as “necessarily predictive and contingent” on how the case pro-
ceeded, including the intrusiveness of discovery and the extent to which the
case required “judicial pronouncements on the official actions of the [gov-
ernment of Indonesia] with respect to its military activities.”260
The court responded by narrowing the claims, parties, and scope of dis-
covery.261  To avoid embarrassment to the Indonesian government, the court
dismissed the claims of genocide and crimes against humanity, leaving only
the common law tort claims; it dismissed the one partially state-owned com-
pany; and it ordered that discovery “avoid intrusion” into Indonesian sover-
eignty and be subject to “firm control” by the court.262
In some ATS cases where American nationals are not the sole defend-
ants, then, both comity and U.S. foreign policy interests may be accommo-
dated by the tools of judicial management.  In other cases, the role of
American defendants and foreign sovereigns may be so intertwined that they
cannot feasibly be separated.  If the comity interest is sufficiently compelling,
then dismissal, as a last resort, may have to be considered in such cases.
257 Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335, 362
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
258 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (subsequent history
omitted).
259 Id. at 22.
260 Id. (quoting the U.S. State Department Statement of Interest).
261 The amicus brief filed by this author on behalf of former U.S. diplomats in Kiobel
made the same point verbatim.  Diplomats Amicus Brief, supra note 23, at 16.
262 Doe, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 29.
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In any event, regardless of whether an ATS suit implicating foreign sov-
ereigns is to proceed in full, in part, or not at all, courts should assess comity
on a case-by-case basis, taking account of any views expressed by the executive
on the foreign policy impacts.  The next Section discusses this claim.
D. Due Deference to the Executive
The executive branch is both better informed than the judiciary on mat-
ters of foreign policy and constitutionally mandated to carry out foreign pol-
icy.263  While this does not oust courts of jurisdiction in all cases affecting
foreign policy264—and in some cases of statutory interpretation involving for-
eign affairs the courts decline to extend any “special deference” to the views
of the executive265—the foreign policy views of the executive should be given
“serious weight” on a case-by-case basis in ATS cases.266
In their amicus brief before the Court in Kiobel, four former State
Department legal advisers argued against case-by-case assessments of extrater-
ritorial ATS suits.  Instead, they advocated a “categorical” denial of extraterri-
torial ATS suits.267  A purely case-by-case approach, they objected, “would
make it difficult or impossible for foreign nations to know whether U.S. law
will apply to conduct within their respective territories.”268  A categorical rule
would help the United States “to maintain stable and predictable relations
with other countries.”269
They also contended that consulting the State Department for its views
on ATS litigation “involving the acts of foreign sovereigns. . . . has not proved
consistently workable.”270  Among other reasons, they argued, “the Depart-
ment has not always responded to the requests, and in some instances where
it has, courts have declined to follow the Department’s recommendation . . . .
And in other cases, the litigation has dragged on so long that the views of the
governments in question later changed.”271
If the only U.S. foreign policy interest were to maintain stable and pre-
dictable relations with other governments, the concerns of the former legal
advisers would be more persuasive.  But the United States is rightly con-
263 E.g., Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (“The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and
Legislative—‘the political’—Departments of the Government . . . .”).
264 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
265 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).  In Kiobel, the majority,
noting a change in interpretation of the ATS by the Solicitor General, declined to follow
his views.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668 (2013).
266 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).  Such deference is appar-
ently not a distinct doctrine, but results from an application of comity or of the political
question doctrine.  Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the Unreasonable Views of the Bush
Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 783 & n.58 (2008).
267 Legal Advisers Amicus Brief, supra note 154, at 26.
268 Id. at 28.
269 Id. at 29.
270 Id. at 32.
271 Id. at 32–33.
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cerned not only about its relations with other governments, but also about its
relations with human beings at home and abroad, and how those relations
are perceived, both by other governments and by the public worldwide.272
Admittedly, as discussed above, the interests of the United States in support-
ing human rights accountability worldwide do not always carry the day in the
face of conflicting interests.  But they sometimes do, and that determination is
best made on a case-by-case basis.273  The problem with the categorical
approach of the former legal advisers is that it would never allow human
rights interests to justify a role for the ATS in accountability for gross viola-
tions of human rights abroad—even when committed by Americans.
The better approach, then, is the one advocated both by the United
States and by the former U.S. diplomats represented by this author in their
respective amicus briefs before the Court in Kiobel: a case-by-case approach to
allowing suits against Americans for human rights violations committed
overseas.274
And in a case-by-case approach, it makes no sense for courts to close
their eyes to the expressed views (if any) of the State Department.  Judicial
independence, as confirmed by judicial rulings to date, counsels against slav-
ishly following whatever the State Department might say.275  But judicial pru-
dence and respect for the constitutional allocation of powers undergird the
Supreme Court’s admonition in Sosa that courts give “serious weight” to the
views of the executive on the foreign policy consequences of adjudicating
particular ATS suits.276
CONCLUSION
The opinion of the five-member Kiobel majority—particularly read in
light of the concurring opinion of one of its members, Justice Kennedy—
does not expressly or by necessary implication foreclose ATS claims against
American nationals for human rights torts committed on foreign shores.  Jus-
tice Breyer’s concurring opinion, joined by three other Justices, correctly
identifies claims against American nationals as one of the classes of extraterri-
torial claims which are consistent with the text and purposes of the ATS and
with international law and practice.  The ATS should be read to permit juris-
272 For the classic exposition of “soft power,” see JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD
(1990).
273 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (approving a “policy of case-
specific deference to the political branches”).
274 Diplomats Amicus Brief, supra note 23, at 8, 9, 14, 18; Supplemental U.S. Amicus
Brief, supra note 177, at 4, 6.
275 Courts have shown independence in assessing the views of the executive in ATS
cases against corporate defendants. See generally Stephens, supra note 266, at 774 (noting
that in eight cases to date in which courts assessed Bush Administration foreign policy
objections to ATS suits against corporations, the courts accepted the objections in only two
cases, while allowing five cases to proceed, and dismissing one case on other grounds, after
explicitly rejecting the objections).
276 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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diction and recognition of common law causes of action against Americans
for torts committed abroad, subject to case-by-case consideration of the limits
proposed by Justice Breyer.
ATS jurisdiction generally should be exercised over such claims only
when reasonable.  The exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable where:
• plaintiffs exhaust their foreign remedies, or need not do so because of
a greater U.S. adjudicative interest, or because they meet an interna-
tionally recognized exception;
• the foreign forum is not clearly more appropriate to provide effective
access to justice and effective remedies for human rights torts; and
• comity toward a foreign sovereign and avoidance of serious interna-
tional discord, judicially assessed after giving serious weight to the
expressed views (if any) of the executive branch, do not outweigh the
factors supporting ATS jurisdiction.  These include U.S. interests in
human rights accountability and in policing serious misconduct by
Americans abroad, as well as the internationally recognized rights of
victims to effective access to justice and effective remedies, and, where
applicable, the interest of lawful resident aliens in a U.S. forum.
In other words, the relevant balance must take into account not only the
interests of the United States and foreign states, but also the interests of the
victims whose human rights our nation espouses.  These three sets of inter-
ests do not always weigh in the same direction.  How best to accommodate
them can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis.  Categorical approaches—
either barring or allowing all claims against our nationals for human rights
torts abroad—are bound to shortchange one or the other set of important
interests.  Allowing no such claims would betray our profound national com-
mitment to human rights accountability worldwide, whereas allowing all of
them would in some cases offend legitimate sovereignty interests of other
nations.  The best way forward, consistent with international law and U.S.
foreign policy interests, is to allow ATS claims against Americans for human
rights violations committed abroad, subject to a case-by-case assessment of
the relevant limits on such cases.  Judicial decisions on whether to allow such
claims must strive to be respectful of both human rights and the legitimate
interests of foreign rule-of-law states.
